Introduction
"You don't know us," confided the narrator in a long-running television commercial.
"We don't make a lot of the products you buy. We make a lot of the products you buy better."
The sponsor of the ad was a company no ordinary consumer would have ever heard of, but it was (according to the ad) a key component in cassette tapes, Sony electronics equipment and other well-known products. The company wasn't the household name, but it made the household name products better. In Foss, a group of shareholders of a nonprofit corporation sought to sue its managers, alleging that the managers had misused their power. Although the court recognized the right of shareholders to sue under some circumstances, it concluded that these particular shareholders
were not entitled to proceed because their allegations related to concerns that affected all of the company's shareholders, and the shareholders as a group had not taken formal action. A shareholder plaintiff, the court held, can only sue if the action in question could not have been approved by the shareholders as a group, or if the managers had engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation. (As an alert reader will have noticed, Foss's reputation as the wellspring of derivative litigation is mildly ironic, given that the case says more about the restrictions on derivative litigation than about the legitimacy of this device.)
In England, subsequent nineteenth century cases very clearly bore the imprint of Foss, hewing closely to both its letter and its spirit. An 1867 case construed Foss's reference to managerial fraud to authorize minority shareholders to sue a majority block that had defrauded them. 6 In a case decided eight years later, the court treated majority/minority fraud and the fraud exception as one and the same. Under Foss, the court said, shareholders can only sue if: 1) the actions in question are ultra vires; or 2) the wrong has been committed by a majority group against the minority. English courts have continued to limit shareholders' right to sue in this fashion ever since. Although several legislative adjustments have been made in recent years in an effort to widen the scope of derivative legislation, they have had very little impact on the frequency of derivative litigation. Derivative litigation has always been extremely uncommon in England, and it remains so today. Although American derivative litigation seems to have developed from the same roots, a very different tree, with vastly more foliage, emerged in this country in the course of the nineteenth century. Unlike their English brethren, American courts never limited shareholder litigation to cases involving ultra vires acts or fraud by a controlling majority. Several of the early cases were not even aimed at managerial misbehavior; shareholders' real target was a third party. In the best known of the suits, Dodge v. Woolsey, 8 a shareholder wanted to challenge a state statute that imposed an income tax on the corporation. Because the company's directors were unwilling to pursue the litigation, the Supreme Court agreed that the shareholder could take up the cudgel himself.
While US courts were far more permissive than their British counterparts, shareholders' right to sue derivatively was never absolute. The courts recognized that simply letting any shareholder sue whenever the directors were not willing to do their bidding would wreck havoc on corporate governance. Early on, they began to impose procedural restrictions. Most importantly, shareholders were required to make demand on the directors before suing-that is, a shareholder could not head to the courthouse until she had first asked directors to take actions themselves. "I think it is necessary to show, in order to warrant the interference of individual stockholders," a New York judge said in an early case, that the constituted representatives of the company, whose especial duty it is to vindicate its rights, have been requested to institute proceedings for that purpose, and have refused to do so." 9 Even with these restrictions, however, shareholders had far more ability to bring a derivative action in the United States than did their counterparts in England.
Not only did US courts define derivative standing quite broadly, but they subsequently encouraged derivative litigation in another way: by giving attorneys an incentive to participate.
In ordinary American litigation, each party bears the costs of its own attorneys. Some states also required that demand be made on the other shareholders, and precluded suit unless a majority of the shareholders approved. The shareholder demand lost much of its bite over time, however, because courts carved out numerous exceptions. Shareholder demand is generally waived, for instance, if the corporation has numerous shareholders and making demand would therefore be costly or inconvenient.
works tolerably well under most circumstances, it discourages the shareholders of widely held corporations from pursuing derivative litigation, even if the managers of their company have acted very badly. If a shareholder holds only a few shares, the costs of pursuing the litigation will almost always dwarf her pro rata share of the expected recovery from the lawsuit. And even if she has a large enough stake to justify taking the laboring oar, she may hesitate to do so, in the hope that someone else will, and will bear the costs, instead. American courts vitiated this problem by applying the "common fund" exception to the usual rule that the plaintiff who brings a suit is saddled with its costs. Under the common fund doctrine, the proceeds of a recovery with numerous beneficiaries is first used to pay attorneys fees and other costs, before anyone else gets a recovery. In effect, paying the lawyers first forces all of the shareholder to bear the cost, since they (or the corporation) recover only after-attorney dollars.
English judges never went in for any of this. Just as they held the line on derivative standing, they never fudged the rules on attorneys fees to make it easier for shareholders to bring derivative litigation. In England, the ordinary rule for attorneys fees is that the loser in a lawsuit pays the lawyers for both sides. England's "loser pays" rule is a particularly unattractive prospect for derivative suit plaintiffs. If the suit fails, as many lawsuits do, the shareholder plaintiff is responsible for not just one, but two sets of attorneys fees. Even shareholders who are not afraid of risk will think twice about making that kind of wager.
Why were US courts so much more accommodating to the derivative mechanism than their British counterparts? The contrast can perhaps be traced, in part, to differences in corporate evolution in the two countries. As first documented in a famous study by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, 10 the shareholdings of many of America's large corporations were widely dispersed by the beginning of the twentieth century. Shareholders' small stakes and distance from the daily operations of the company made it difficult for them to monitor the company's managers. The expansion of derivative litigation, together with the payment of attorneys fees if the litigation was successful, gave shareholders a tool for policing their managers. "Equity came to the relief of the shareholder," as the Supreme Court put it in 1949, and "allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution [against managers who profit personally at the expense of their trust] he could not demand in his own."
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In contrast to the US, family control was the norm even with the largest UK corporations until much later. 12 Because shareholders were more actively involved in the company's affairs and could use ordinary internal governance mechanisms such as corporate voting to police its managers, they had less need for a robust external enforcement mechanism like derivative litigation. UK shareholdings did eventually disperse after World War II, but they were still more concentrated than in the US, due in part to tax and dividend policies that encouraged institutions rather than individuals to hold stock. In reality, Wood concluded, the plaintiffs had very little to do with the litigation at all.
They were essentially a front for the plaintiff's attorneys, who were the real beneficiaries of the derivative suits because their fees were paid in full if the litigation provided a benefit to the company. The attorneys' "shoddy burlesque of a professional relationship to the clients," as Wood put it, "makes the ambulance-chaser by comparison a paragon of propriety. He at least represents a real client, with usually real injuries, and a legitimate interest in 50% of the recovery." 18 The attorneys' fees were "among the largest possible for practitioners in any field of law," and the corporation usually indemnified the directors' fees as well, which meant it essential bore the costs of both sides.
It should be noted that Wood had no quarrel with derivative litigation in the close corporation context, as this litigation was usually brought by minority shareholders with a significant stake who alleged misbehavior by the majority. For publicly held firms, on the other hand, derivative litigation needed radical surgery. Indeed, Wood's report was in the nature of a brief (a brief commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce, a leading business group). The solution, he concluded, was to limit standing to shareholders who owned stock at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, and to require the shareholder plaintiff to post security for costs in the event the litigation were found to have been meritless.
With an alacrity that reflected the influence of business, the seriousness of the flaws in the derivative mechanism, the persuasiveness of Wood's handiwork, or some combination of the three, the New York legislature enacted the nation's first security for expenses statute the same month report was issued. Under the New York provision, a plaintiff was required to post "security for reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees," unless the plaintiff owned at least 5% If the plaintiff wins, moreover, any recovery comes straight to her rather than going first (and sometimes only) to the corporation.
From the plaintiff's perspective, suing directly thus is a dream by comparison to the derivative mechanism. But it has two obvious limitations. The first is that the plaintiff must persuade the court that the injury is indeed direct. The line between direct and derivative in the caselaw is fuzzy, to put it charitably, but courts tend to treat allegations of general mismanagement as derivative (the initial victim of the harm is the company itself; shareholders are harmed only indirectly, since the deterioration in value lowers the value of their shares), while interference with the incidents of a share of stock, such as its voting rights, is characterized as a direct harm. Second, the small stakes of most shareholders in a large corporation make solo litigation unattractive both for them and for an attorney. would ... have been amazed if told that the acts which they were passing would have the effect of granting an implied private right of action," the leading academic critic of these suits groused.
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But courts increasingly allowed the suits to go forward, and the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur in 1964. 24 To makes matters even better, at least from the defendants' perspective, courts held that these suits were not subject either to the procedural restrictions that applied to the other, explicitly authorized causes, or, as we have seen, to the state law restrictions imposed on derivative litigation.
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The SEC fueled the growth of federal securities litigation by steadily expanding the scope of the 1934 Act in general, and Rules 14 and 10b-5 in particular. Although the proxy rules apply only to publicly held companies, the SEC defined publicly held to include not only companies listed on the national exchanges, but any company with at least $1 million in assets and 500
shareholders. 26 Of even greater moment, the Commission, under its activist Chairman William
Cary, interpreted Rule 10b-5 to prohibit inside trading both by insiders and wide range of others, and it used the rule to police any misdisclosure made by the company. In one of its most important rulings, the SEC marveled at its own handiwork, praising the "wholly new and farreaching body of federal corporation law," and quoted from a recent case that had described Rule 10b-5 as "a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties.
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The last piece in the puzzle was the class action device. In the 1970s, the pendulum shifted back, as the Supreme Court began to narrow the scope of securities litigation. Of particular importance for our purposes, the Court held that Rule 10b-5 could not be used to police violations by directors or officers of their fiduciary duties. 30 Fiduciary duty was the province of state corporate law, according to the Court, and
Congress didn't intend to subsume it into the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. In other cases, the Court limited relief to investors who had actually bought or sold securities (denying relief to those who claimed they were tricked into holding their stock rather than selling by the defendants' misstatements) and held that Rule 10b-5 required a showing of scienter-it wasn't enough to show that the defendant had acted negligently.
31
Both federal securities class actions and state law derivative suits have continued to be controversial. In the decades after the Wood Report, researchers conducted several subsequent 28 These changes also added Federal Rule 23.1, which requires the plaintiff in a derivative suit to describe "efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiffs desires from the directors ... and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." The rule thus incorporates the demand requirement for derivative cases brought in federal court, while leaving the content of the requirement to state law. 29 The most prominent source of state law corporate class actions is litigation over an acquisition or sale. the options before they announced the company's intention to make a tender offer for its own shares at a hefty premium over the current price. If they bought the stock while the stock price was still low, the directors would have a much lower tax bill on their gains (the difference between the lower stock price, rather than the higher one, and their exercise price), while the company would have a correspondingly lower deduction for the expense to it of the compensation. Pushing back the exercise date benefited the directors themselves, in other words, but hurt the company. Shareholders brought a derivative suit against the Zapata directors alleging that the options slight-of-hand violated their duty of loyalty.
In the past, directors who had been caught with their hands in the cookie jar like this could not have done anything to slow or stymy the litigation's onward march. They all had participated in the decision to move back the exercise date, so demand clearly would be excused. In a much discussed New York decision, the court had given considerable deference to a similarly constituted special litigation committee. 35 Under the New York approach, the court would assess the independence of the directors on the committee and the thoroughness of their investigation. But the committee's substantive decision on the litigation would enjoy the same business judgment rule deference as other directorial decisions.
The New York approach spurred cries of alarm from advocates of derivative litigation.
The "independent" committees set up by directors who had been sued invariably concluded that the litigation would simply be too costly, or the prospects of recovery too slim, to justify continuation. Some observers attributed the defendant-colored glasses with which the committees seemed to view litigation to a "structural bias" in board decision making: many board members were beholden to or had longstanding relationships with, the company's chief executive, and board members tended to come from the same professional and social circles.
Given this bias, they argued, courts should give little deference to the committee's conclusions. Quillen wrote, the analysis should proceed to a second step: "The Court should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted."
This is a radically different standard than the New York approach. In response, the defendants asked the chancery court to dismiss the complaint for failure to make demand. In their briefing in the chancery court, the defendants repeatedly emphasized two points: first, the allegations really implicated Fink, not the board as a whole; and second, the attempt to implicate the rest of the board "has relied on conclusory and self-manufactured claims of 'futility' in order to avoid the salutory requirements of Rule 23.1," which requires that a derivative suit plaintiff either make demand or state with particularity the reasons for not making demand. 41 At this point, the opinion took a surprising turn. After concluding that the plaintiff did not adequately allege that the board itself was tainted, the vice chancellor said that a court "often must look for evidence of why approval would have been wrongful," and conducted his own inquiry into the underlying contract. 44 In his view, the provision in Fink's compensation agreement which guaranteed payment even if Fink was unable to perform any services "may have constituted the approval of a transaction wasteful on its face." 45 Because this provision may have been "one which no reasonable man could have approved in the belief that the corporation was getting a quid pro quo," the court concluded, demand was excused and the defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied.
In a short addendum attached to the opinion after the defendants asked for the reargument, the vice chancellor suggested that his decision to take his own look at the underlying transaction, rather than just the plaintiff's allegations about the directors' complicity, was inspired at least in part by Zapata. In order to properly balance shareholders interest in bringing The argument in the Supreme Court was curious in one respect, and as we shall see later, dramatic in another. It was curious in that the unusual trajectory of the chancery court opinion put the parties in an odd posture before the Supreme Court. "The defendants say that they agree with much of the Opinion below," as the plaintiff (and appellee in the Supreme Court) put it, "but disagree with the result ... For his part, the plaintiff finds himself in disagreement with much of the opinion below, but, at the same time, agrees with the result." 48 The defendants praised the vice chancellor's conclusion that Fink's 47% stock ownership did not constitute a factual basis for suggesting that he dominated and controlled the board of directors. Even if Fink had owned an absolute majority and could single handedly select the directors, they argued, this
would not show that the directors failed to exercise independent judgment. There was simply no adequate factual allegation that the directors could not be trusted to make an appropriate decision whether to pursue the litigation. They also agreed that acquiescence in or approval by the directors of the challenged transactions is not a basis for excusing demand. It was only in the opinion's final twist, with the court's conclusion that it could infer the possibility of waste from a provision in the contract, the defendants argued, that the lower court lost its way.
The plaintiff, despite having won below, spend much of his brief insisting, contrary to the vice chancellor's conclusion, that Fink's 47% stock ownership clearly enabled him to dominate and control the rest of the board. Having shown that the defendant had a controlling block of stock, the plaintiff argued, he should not be required to show actual domination-that is, that the directors selected by the defendant failed to exercise independent judgment-until after he had an opportunity for full discovery. "To force the plaintiff to plead more facts" at the outset of the case, before having the opportunity for discovery, he complained, "which is the inevitable consequence of the Vice Chancellor's ruling on the control issue, represents judicial insistence on the necessity to plead voluminous evidence contrary to the letter and spirit of the Rules of the have been wasteful, the defendants warned ("and here," they emphasized, "the possible inference of wastefulness was based on an allegation concerning a single provision in an employment contract"), "demand will never be required, and a derivative suit will always go forward with the board being unable to exercise judgment to refused to bring it or to terminate it, no matter what the real interests of the corporation may be."
The plaintiff feared precisely the opposite. If alleging that Fink held 47% of Meyer's stock and personally selected all of the directors was not adequate to excuse demand, demand would rarely if ever be excused. This view, according to the plaintiff, "mocks Zapata," since under such an onerous demand requirement, "the two-step procedure established by Zapata, confined as it is to demand futile cases, would rarely be invoked." 51 The Supreme Court "must insure," the plaintiff concluded, "that the demand on directors issue will not 'make the derivative suit an endangered species of legal action.'" In the two years since it was decided, Zapata had proven quite unpopular ("a spectacular failure," in the words of one subsequent commentator). 54 There was general agreement with the court's skepticism of special litigation committees, but the conclusion that the chancery court should exercise its own business judgment seemed to fly in the face of generations of teaching about the respective roles of courts and corporate boards: that directors not courts were the ones who made business decisions.
Justice Quillen certainly did not echo these complaints in his argument. Nor did he suggest for a moment that the Court should revisit Zapata. But his argument for a narrow exception to the demand requirement would, if the Supreme Court agreed, significantly reduce the future relevance of Zapata. He was asking the Court to sharply limit the reach of the case that he himself had decided.
After the author of Zapata sat down, plaintiff's attorney Joseph Rosenthal was immediately pressed to defend the Chancery Court's conclusion that demand was excused because waste could be inferred from the contract. What factual basis, Justice Moore asked, did he have for the claim that Fink was incapable of working for Meyers and thus that the contract intended to pay him for doing nothing? Fink was already 75 years old, Rosenthal said (an argument that Quillen had already parried by pointing out that many people continue to work long after they turn 70, including Delaware's governor and a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court), and that Fink also worked for Prudential. Justice Moore also worried that under the broader exception to demand advocated by the plaintiff, demand would be excused any time a derivative action was brought against a company that had a controlling shareholder.
When it issued its opinion several months later, the Delaware Supreme Court returned a decisive victory for the defendants and for a sharply constrained demand futility exception.
After noting that this case addressed the "crucial issue [left] unanswered" by Zapata, the court flatly rejected the chancery court's conclusion that the court should excuse demand if it could reasonably infer from the underlying transaction that the directors had permitted a waste of the corporation's assets. 55 "In our view," Justice Moore wrote, "demand can only be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a reasonable doubt that the directors' action was entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule." As it often does with its judicial formulas, the court distilled the issue of business judgment to a two-part test: "[I]n determining demand futility the Court of Chancery ... must decide whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a value business judgment. Hence, the Court of Chancery must make two inquiries, one into the independence and disinterestedness of the directors and the other into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board's approval thereof." 56 Only if the plaintiff alleges particularized facts suggesting either 55 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 807. The quote that follows appears on p.808. 56 Id. at 814.
that a majority of the board was tainted or that the transaction could not satisfy the business judgment rule will demand be excused.
There is no "there but for the grace of God" language in the court's Aronson opinion. To the contrary, Justice Moore went out of his way to reject arguments that structural bias invariably taints the decisionmaking even of ostensibly independent boards. "Critics will charge that we are ignoring the structural bias common to corporate boards throughout America," he wrote, "as well as the other unseen socialization processes cutting against independent discussion and decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural bias in a demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the complaint for purposes of Rule 23.1. We are satisfied that discretionary review by the Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a particular board will be sufficient for determining demand futility." 57 If Justice
Moore's opinion makes any assumption about the psychology of a corporate board, the assumption seems to be this: if a majority of the directors are independent, they are likely to constitute a critical mass that is capable (unless shown otherwise) to resist even a controlling shareholder or a powerful chief executive.
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Here, the plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently particularized facts to satisfy either prong.
Because the facts in this case-most prominently, Fink's inability to perform the contract and Fink's domination of the board-were simply conclusory allegations, demand was required and the plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed for failure to make demand.
Do Derivative Suits Still Matter?
With Aronson, Delaware's framework for determining when shareholders can pursue derivative litigation was complete. The framework and its legacy will be considered in more detail below. But we first take up a more basic issue: do derivative suits still matter?
57 Id. at 815 n.8. So why would anyone file derivatively? One reason, not surprisingly, is that some cases cannot easily be framed either as a securities class action or as a direct action under state law.
The most obvious example is alleged misbehavior by a closely held corporation. Because these corporations are not subject to the securities law disclosure requirements, disgruntled shareholders cannot frame their complaints as securities violations. Second, derivative litigation and securities class actions are often brought simultaneously, based on the same behavior, as the parties try to secure a favored venue, for instance, or simply because different lawyers are involved. Finally, in some cases, the misbehavior may be so egregious that the procedural requirements for filing derivatively do not pose a serious barrier. 61 Indeed, Aronson is most widely cited for its articulation of the business judgment rule, which it defines as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." 473 A.2d at 812. The overall project had mixed success. Perhaps the entire corpus of fiduciary duty regulation can be routed through the business judgment rule, but it is not always clear that the game is worth the candle. The business judgment rule is incidental to the real analysis in the takeover cases, which turns on the reasonableness of the target directors' response to an unwanted takeover. In Aronson, however, framing the demand inquiry in terms of the business judgment rule has proven to be a brilliant stroke. Unlike with the takeover cases, the question whether the directors would be entitled to the benefits of the business judgment rule is essential to determining whether their decision (in this case, the refusal to sue) should be respected.
Viewing the demand futility through the lens of the business judgment rule thus makes perfect sense. In retrospect, Aronson demand futility standard can be seen as a side effect-a remarkably happy one, I will argue-of the court's larger quest for a unified field theory of directors' fiduciary duties in corporate law.
The first prong is where much of the action is. The classic case for excusing demand is a challenge to a transaction in which the directors each have a financial interest, as in Zapata. If all of the directors truly are implicated, nearly everyone agrees that demand should be excused.
The more difficult case comes when a key manager is implicated but many of the other directors are not. Some observers believed that, because of the structural bias on boards, demand should ordinarily be excused in this case. Aronson refused to presume structural bias, as we have seen.
Only if a majority of the board is either interested or can be shown to be controlled by the interested director is demand excused under Aronson's first prong.
It is worth noting that the standard for directorial disinterest in Delaware is broader and more flexible than the strict formula for disinterestedness mandated by the stock exchanges after 68 More recent years have seen proposals to create a committee of shareholders or independent experts to pass judgment on the litigation. 69 (The presumption in federal securities class actions that the largest shareholder will serve as the lead plaintiff is in a similar spirit.) The Achilles heel of the proposals is a suspicion that they would be cumbersome to put in place and might not improve shareholder litigation all that much.
The proposal that has gained the most traction takes precisely the opposite tack. Rather trying to create a more traditional attorney-client relationship, with the client monitoring the attorneys actions, this approach advocates that the role of plaintiff's attorney be auctioned to the law firm that offers the highest price. 70 After the winning bid is distributed to shareholders or the company, the client would essentially disappear. The attorneys themselves would pursue the litigation, and would keep any recovery. Because the attorneys would be litigating on their own behalf once they paid the shareholders, their conflict of interest would disappear. They would focus on obtaining the best possible result in the case. Although no court has conducted this kind of auction to determine the lead counsel in a shareholders' suit (and practical obstacles such as prohibitions on buying stakes in litigation would interfere), courts in several securities fraud cases have asked law firms to submit applications disclosing the percentage of any recovery they expected to receive, and courts have selected lawyers based on these applications. 71 have an interest in maximizing her own fees rather than the overall recovery. The auction also could leave shareholders with incompetent counsel if poor lawyers underbid their competitors and the court did not assess the quality of the firm. If courts did take a closer look at the law firm quality, low bid auctions perhaps could help to moderate fees. Although the strategy has been used only in federal class actions to date, in principle it could be used in a derivative case as well.
Aronson and the Federal Securities Law Reforms
In the twenty-five years since Aronson, the framework for handling derivative litigation has remained relatively constant, while Congress has twice intervened to reshape the basic parameters of securities class action litigation. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that the investor who has the largest stake in a securities class action will be named as the lead plaintiff in the action. The 1995 Act also requires that securities plaintiffs "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind"-that is, that the defendant knowingly or recklessly violated the securities laws. 72 Both of these provisions are designed to stymy strikes suits, the first by increasing the likelihood that the plaintiff will exercise meaningful oversight over the class attorneys, and the second by making it easier to kick out suits that are sloppy or obviously nonmeritorious. In 1998, Congress again intervened, forcing most plaintiffs' to bring their federal securities class action cases in federal courts after numerous plaintiffs had circumvented the strictures of the 1995 act by filing in state court.
Whether the reforms have increased the proportion of meritorious suits is still a matter of debate. The existing empirical studies are somewhat mixed, with some evidence that the reforms are achieving their intended effect and some that there has been little measurable change. Studies focusing on particular provisions, rather than the reforms as a whole, also do not find dramatic effects. A recent study of the lead plaintiff provision suggests that the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff slightly increases the expected settlement amount in the case, but that overall settlement amounts have not increased since the 1995 reform and the ratio of the settlement to the estimated magnitude of the company's provable losses from alleged misbehavior has actually decreased. 74 Superficially, the securities class action reforms have magnified the differences between federal securities cases and state law derivative actions, since none of the new bells and whistles applies to old fashioned derivative cases. In reality, the federal changes can be seen as evidence that the two forms of shareholder litigation are evolving in the same direction. This parallel evolution is most evident with the new pleading standard, which serves, in a sense, as a substitute for Aronson's demand requirement. Like Aronson, it imposes a heightened pleading standard that is designed to discourage sloppy pleading and to ensure that only serious allegations survive. In each context, moreover, the determination whether litigation should go forward is made primarily by a court, in response to a motion to dismiss in the early stages of the case.
The real differences in securities class actions and derivative suits are found less in procedural niceties than elsewhere. As we have seen, the continuing expansion of the securities laws has created liability for behavior that would not be actionable under state law. This suggests an obvious but rarely noted conclusion about contemporary shareholder litigation. To the extent one worries about contemporary shareholder litigation, the place to look for answers is in the substantive provisions of the securities acts. Reversing the trend toward ever more expansive disclosure requirements would do far more to rein in shareholder litigation than any of the procedural changes that garner most of the attention.
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evidence that the act may have discouraged some non-nuisance claims that lacked "hard evidence" of fraud. 
Conclusion
Shareholder litigation is probably the least loved form of litigation. In the popular perception, plaintiff's attorneys sue at the drop of a hat-or more precisely, the drop of a stock price-and they pocket huge fees in cases that provide only a token recovery for shareholders.
Shareholder litigation is not the only way to police corporate directors, but it is deeply entrenched in this country. It is hard to imagine shifting to an alternative strategy, such as the use of governmental regulators one finds in the U.K.
Against this unpromising backdrop, Aronson v. Lewis has been a rather remarkable success. Its two prong test works effectively both for the close corporations that supply half of all derivative disputes, and for the high profile cases that get all of the attention. Nearly twentyfive years after Aronson, it seems fair to say that lumping derivative suits with federal securities class actions together gives derivative litigation a bad rap. All in all, at least in Delaware, the derivative mechanism works better than ever before.
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994)(suggesting the SEC has the power to disimply). Reversing the private right of action would leave the SEC as the principal enforcer of the provisions (like sections 10 and 14) that do not explicitly provide for a private cause of action. As difficult as this is to imagine, it may well be what the drafters of the securities acts contemplated, and it is essentially the approach one sees in the U.K.
